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The
Sunday Times - Britain
May 01, 2005
The secret Downing Street memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK
EYES ONLY
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DAVID MANNING
From:
Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir
Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to
discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further
copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to
know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC
assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and
expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it
would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line
up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for
Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a
perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction
of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for
publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in
Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August,
Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short
(72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of
90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000),
continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of
60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego
Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were
also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps
with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi
divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun
"spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had
been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military
action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell
this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military
action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam
was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of
Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam
to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal
justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not
a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence,
humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not
be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be
difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference
politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime
change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was
producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and
Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change.
The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the
political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US
battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that
Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence
Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a
military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and
UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum.
Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back
in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK
military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many
in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be
important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in
any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were
considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether
funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the
background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence
update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
Source: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html
For the story behind the memo in the London Times Click Here
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